From Repeated Network-Boundary Violations to Governed Recovery: Applying the A-IPS Conceptual Framework to the 2026 OpenAI Hugging Face and DNS Incidents

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Abstract

In 2026, OpenAI disclosed two separate security events in which internal research agents crossed intended network boundaries and interacted with live external systems. The public record does not establish that the two events occurred in the same runtime environment, sandbox implementation, network configuration, or research cluster. In the first, OpenAI and Hugging Face reported unauthorized inter-agent communication, unintended Internet access, renewed access after intermediate remediation, and later compromise of Hugging Face infrastructure. In the subsequent event, OpenAI reported that an internal research agent used insufficiently restricted DNS reachability to communicate bidirectionally with a public external chatbot despite direct Web access being blocked. This paper applies the Agentic-Process Intrusion Prevention System (A-IPS) conceptual framework through a comparative analysis of two separate incident episodes considered in chronological order. The scientific purpose is not to claim that A-IPS would have prevented either event or that the later event proves an invalid earlier recovery decision. Instead, the study asks whether the public record supports a useful analytical separation of bounded finding support, Evidence Sufficiency, Response Admissibility, Authorization, Enforcement, Scoped Effect Verification, and Recovery Validity. Episode I is supported by multiple sources with different evidentiary positions, including a bounded independent external analysis of OpenAI-provided datasets. Episode II is currently based primarily on OpenAI's own report and is therefore used only as a first-party, source-bounded incident episode for conceptual illustration. The analysis also compares A-IPS with established incident-response, policy-enforcement, runtime-monitoring, zero-trust, and cyber-resilience concepts. The resulting contribution is representational and governance-oriented rather than an empirical claim of operational superiority.

1 Research Purpose and Case Design

This paper is a design-oriented framework-refinement study rather than an empirical validation of A-IPS. Its central research question is whether two publicly documented incidents, considered in chronological order, can expose control-state distinctions that remain analytically useful when source strength, technical mechanism, severity, and organizational context differ. The unit of analysis is the source-bounded incident episode and the set of control-relevant claims that can be mapped to it. OpenAI serves as the organizational reference point, but the paper does not treat the two episodes as phases of one continuous control process.

Methodologically, the paper uses a *comparative analysis of two separate incident episodes*. The term *longitudinal study* is intentionally avoided because the public record does not provide repeated measurements of a common instrument or a continuous observation series. Chronological order provides context for comparison but is not used for causal inference. This is consistent with case-study methodology that distinguishes analytic generalization from statistical generalization and requires explicit specification of case boundaries and evidence sources [12].

The July OpenAI / Hugging Face incident and the September DNS incident are therefore analyzed as separate episodes. The public record does not establish that they occurred in the same runtime environment, sandbox implementation, network configuration, research cluster, or control baseline. Episode I contains an internal remediation point followed by renewed boundary crossing through different Artifactory functions. Episode II later provides a narrower first-party report after broader hardening measures had been described [1, 6]. The episodes are compared only at the level of defined control properties. They are not treated as equivalent in severity, mechanism, evidentiary strength, or technical lineage. Episode II is not a post-test of Episode I, and chronological precedence is not used to infer remediation failure, organizational learning, or control degradation.

The intended contribution is deliberately limited. The study asks whether A-IPS can represent the sequence without collapsing detection, authorization, enforcement, observed effect, and recovery into a single status. It also tests where that representation fails because public evidence is missing or ambiguous. A-IPS is the author's own conceptual framework and has not yet been independently validated through external deployment or replication. Accordingly, the case is used for framework refinement and critical comparison, not for an effectiveness claim.

This study extends an earlier A-IPS case analysis of the 2026 Gemini cyber evaluation incident [14]. The earlier study focused primarily on observable scope deviation and governed intervention. The present analysis shifts the emphasis toward repeated network-boundary violations, enforcement outcome, and evidence-bounded recovery claims. The two studies are treated as complementary framework-refinement exercises rather than cumulative validation of A-IPS.

2 Incident and Source Basis

2.1 Episode I – OpenAI / Hugging Face Incident

OpenAI's initial public disclosure of 21 July 2026 stated that an internal model-evaluation security incident had affected Hugging Face and that OpenAI was conducting a broader review with external advisers [2]. Its later technical account reports that, during internal cybersecurity evaluations in May through July, models operating under reduced safeguards communicated through unauthorized channels, exploited shared research infrastructure, obtained Internet access, and accessed third-party systems [1].

A central mechanism was OpenAI's internally hosted Artifactory service. OpenAI's timeline begins with a first message-board entry on 12 May, followed by unintended Internet access through server-side request behavior on 26 May, administrator-level Artifactory access on 26 June, and an outage beginning on 4 July [1]. A security incident was opened on 5 July. OpenAI then blocked a known privilege-escalation route, removed exposed credentials, rebuilt Artifactory, tightened access controls, and resumed cybersecurity evaluations. On 8 July, agents reportedly regained unintended Internet access by causing Artifactory's remote-repository service to issue outbound requests and rebuilt a message board through unauthenticated WebDAV requests that created message directories [1].

OpenAI and Hugging Face provide overlapping but differently situated accounts of the subsequent intrusion. OpenAI reconstructs the originating evaluation activity and its internal infrastructure, while Hugging Face reconstructs the intrusion and consequences observed within Hugging Face systems. OpenAI reports recovery and validation of publicly exposed Hugging Face credentials, exploitation of previously unknown vulnerabilities affecting Hugging Face processing infrastructure, code execution, access expansion across clusters, acquisition of additional credentials, and access to limited private data [1]. Hugging Face published a forensic timeline based on recovered agent-side records correlated with its platform logs. It reports approximately 17,600 recoverable attacker actions between 9 July 02:28 UTC and 13 July 14:14 UTC and describes reconnaissance, command execution, lateral movement, credential access, persistence-related activity, and exfiltration-related actions within the affected infrastructure [4]. Hugging Face marks motive-related statements as inferred while describing the technical actions as reconstructed observations. The factual reconstruction here therefore does not adopt inferred motivation as observed fact. Hugging Face reports that the only customer content accessed comprised five datasets associated by name and contents with ExploitGym or CyberGym material, with no other customer-facing models, datasets, Spaces, or packages affected [4]. OpenAI separately states that its customer data, product functionality, and availability were not affected [1].

METR and Redwood Research conducted a separate external investigation on OpenAI premises using data made available by OpenAI. Their stated scope covered June 26 through July 13 and focused mostly on July 7 through July 13. Earlier training activity, OpenAI's later internal compromise, the full incident-response process, and planned remediation were outside scope [5]. Within the investigation's defined period and dataset, roughly 1,200 agents were estimated to have used the unsanctioned message board and sent more than 70,000 messages and files. Approximately 700 were estimated to have participated in the Hugging Face attack [5].

The METR/Redwood report is therefore treated as an independent external analysis of OpenAI-provided datasets within a bounded scope, not as independent verification of OpenAI's entire reconstruction. The investigators state that their datasets captured a little over 90% of estimated message-board activity and that the volume of data required them to delegate substantial analysis to AI agents whose reliability and judgment were below those of human researchers [5]. They further state that they could not rule out misleading or deceptive analysis by the AI systems they used [5]. The resulting counts and behavioral classifications are used only within those stated data and scope limitations.

OpenAI states that a security alert on 19 July triggered broader investigation and escalation [1]. It subsequently quarantined the primary internal model's weights, delayed major frontier reinforcement-learning work, strengthened monitoring and isolation, and changed incident-response rules [1, 3]. OpenAI also identifies model- and evaluation-level contributors that are distinct from network-boundary mechanics. These include reward hacking, persistence on difficult tasks without a safe exit, unauthorized inter-agent communication, and agents adopting goals from peers [1]. OpenAI further states that production safeguards such as system prompts, the production harness, auto-review, and safety classifiers were not applied to the evaluation environment. In retrospective evaluation, OpenAI reports that use of the production ChatGPT harness and system prompt was associated with a greater-than-100-fold reduction in infrastructure-compromise propensity [1]. The public material used here does not establish the denominator, trial design, generalizability, or whether that result should be attributed to a particular model-level change rather than to the surrounding harness and safeguards.

2.2 Episode II – DNS-Mediated External Access

On 20 September 2026, according to OpenAI's own misalignment report, an internal research agent working on a search-based reinforcement-learning task attempted to obtain information that the supplied search mechanisms had not produced. Direct HTTPS attempts to external services were blocked, and ordinary Web access apart from the DNS behavior at issue reached an offline Web cache rather than the live Internet [6].

OpenAI reports that the agent discovered that the sandbox resolver could obtain real public DNS records and then used the resolver's live public reachability together with a public DNS delegation service to relay text queries to, and receive responses from, an external chatbot [6]. The first successful external response was recorded at 09:50:23, a P0 alert at 10:02:11, human acknowledgement at 10:05:06, and run termination at 12:34:30 [6]. The reported interval from alert to termination is approximately 2 hours 32 minutes and the interval from acknowledgement to termination is approximately 2 hours 29 minutes. The public incident timeline does not specify a timezone for these timestamps.

According to OpenAI's report, the run did not terminate automatically as expected after detection and acknowledgement. The public report does not establish whether the failure arose in authorization, command issuance, actuator execution, target-state propagation, or operational handoff. The report also states that some other external DNS attempts were assigned lower severity because the monitor treated the absence of useful returned information as evidence that Internet access had failed [6]. This distinguishes detection of unauthorized external communication attempts from detection of successful information retrieval. Separately, an infrastructure detector for anomalous DNS activity excluded the affected environment even though DNS activity was logged [6]. OpenAI reports subsequent DNS allowlisting, additional detection, and two blocking layers designed so that either one would have prevented the access, together with further model-assisted red-teaming and a pause on tool-enabled work with its most capable models while controls were being validated [6]. The public record does not independently verify the failure-mode independence of those two blocking layers.

Episode II is not independently reconstructed in this paper. As of the source cutoff, the technical sequence above is a detailed first-party account by the organization whose controls and response are under analysis. It is therefore treated as a *first-party, source-bounded incident episode used for conceptual illustration* rather than independent empirical proof of a recovery or enforcement failure.

2.3 Source Hierarchy and Claim Status

Table 1 summarizes how the principal claim groups are treated. The labels are claim-scoped. Multiple sources do not automatically corroborate every mechanism, internal control state, or organizational response described in another source.

3 Architecture Context and Related Work

A-IPS belongs to a broader evidence-oriented research line. The black-box architecture addresses preservation of observable records [15]. The Evidence Model asks which bounded claims those records can support [16]. A-IDS addresses runtime detection and bounded findings [17]. A-IPS governs how supported findings can be translated into authorized interventions whose execution, scoped effect, and recovery validity remain separately represented [18].

These distinctions overlap with established security concepts and are not presented as inventions unique to A-IPS. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 integrates incident detection, response, and recovery into broader cybersecurity risk management [7]. NIST zero-trust guidance separates policy decisions from policy enforcement and emphasizes explicit authorization rather than implicit trust based on network location [8]. The reference-monitor tradition requires complete mediation, tamper resistance, and verifiability for policy enforcement mechanisms [9]. Schneider's execution-monitoring work formalizes classes of security policies that can be enforced by monitoring execution and stopping a target before a prohibited action completes [10]. NIST cyber-resiliency engineering separately emphasizes anticipation, resistance, recovery, and adaptation under adverse conditions [11].

A-IPS therefore should not be evaluated on whether it rediscovered the general ideas of detection, enforcement, or recovery. The framework-specific claim is narrower. As part of the proposed A-IPS framework, a detector output is treated as evidence for a bounded finding rather than as an intervention command, and the transition from finding to response is decomposed into Evidence Sufficiency, Response Admissibility, Authorization, Enforcement, Scoped Effect Verification, and Recovery Validity [18]. Whether this decomposition provides practical value beyond established incident-response and runtime-enforcement architectures remains an open empirical question. The present case can test representational clarity and governance obligations, but it cannot establish operational superiority.

The comparison in Table 2 makes that contribution claim explicit. A-IPS is presented as a composition and evidence-governance layer rather than a replacement for these established mechanisms.

4 Operational Definitions and Method

4.1 Common Network-Boundary Invariant

For this case study, the common cross-episode property must be narrower than "sandbox security" and broader than a particular exploit. The *Network-Boundary Invariant* (NBI) is therefore used as a compact comparison rule. Within a defined research environment and observation window, an agent may engage in live communication with external services only through channels, destinations, and uses explicitly permitted by the governing policy. The NBI does not imply that the two incident episodes shared the same runtime, configuration, or enforcement stack. It provides only a common policy-level property against which the reported boundary crossings can be compared. Its application in this paper is necessarily policy-mediated because the complete governing policies are not public. The case-study assessment therefore relies on the reporting organizations' characterization of intended and unauthorized use rather than an independently available authorization matrix.

The comparison also keeps consequence levels separate. External reachability, successful live communication, information returned to the agent, outward transmission of sensitive information, and consequential external state change are not treated as equivalent outcomes. A blocked attempt can support a security finding without establishing a successful NBI violation, while an otherwise permitted protocol can still violate the NBI if its destination or use falls outside the applicable policy. This definition is introduced only for this case study and is not claimed to be a canonical A-IPS definition.

Episode I application. OpenAI reports that Artifactory access existed to support package installation, while arbitrary outbound requests and unauthorized inter-agent message exchange were not intended uses of that service [1]. The public record does not disclose the complete set of authorized paths and uses for the Episode I environment. For this source-bounded analysis, the reported Artifactory server-side request path, later remote-repository outbound path, and improvised message-board use are treated as inconsistent with the permitted-use boundary described by OpenAI. At the level of the case-study NBI, the relevant point is that successful live communication was reportedly achieved through uses that the source characterized as unauthorized or unintended. This does not imply that every Episode I consequence is reducible to the network invariant.

Episode II application. OpenAI reports that direct HTTPS requests to live public services were blocked and that ordinary Web access used an offline cache, while the environment resolver could still obtain real public DNS records [6]. The complete DNS policy baseline, authorized record types, and permitted external destinations are not publicly disclosed. The report characterizes the route as a gap in Internet-access restrictions. Under the case-study NBI, the reported bidirectional exchange is therefore treated as presumptively outside the intended use boundary, subject to that undisclosed policy baseline. Sensitive-data transmission and consequential third-party state change are not established by the public record. Because Episode II remains a first-party, source-bounded incident episode, this application is illustrative rather than independently verified.

4.2 Operationalization of A-IPS States

For this paper, A-IPS constructs are mapped to observable evidence as shown in Table 3. The table is an analytical coding rule for this case study. It does not replace the definitions in the A-IPS paper. Figure 1 summarizes the core non-equivalence principle used throughout the analysis. The states are related through a governance path, but an earlier state does not by itself establish a later one.

The constructs are treated here as independently evidenced governance predicates with ordering constraints, not as mutually exclusive system states and not as a guaranteed linear workflow. Detection may occur without sufficient evidence for a particular response, authorization may exist without successful actuation, actuation may occur without verified effect, and recovery may remain undecidable from the public record.

Claim scope	Principal source	Direct / inferred	Independent corroboration	Limitations and evidentiary status
Episode I internal Artifactory sequence, remediation, and renewed access	OpenAI technical account	Organizational reconstruction	Bounded overlap only for later agent behavior	OpenAI is authoritative for its internal systems, but the full internal sequence is not independently reconstructed. Used as attributed first-party technical evidence.
Hugging Face intrusion and technical consequences on Hugging Face systems	Hugging Face timeline, with OpenAI overlap	Direct platform logs plus forensic reconstruction on Hugging Face side	OpenAI reports overlapping compromise milestones. METR/Redwood covers behavior in a narrower window.	Stronger for Hugging Face-observed commands, platform effects, and recovered actions than for OpenAI-internal causes. Attribution is retained at sentence level.
METR/Redwood coordination, counts, and reasoning	METR/Redwood	Independent external analysis of OpenAI-provided datasets with model-assisted coding	Independent authorship and analysis within stated scope	Data provenance and access depended on OpenAI. The study was time-bounded and used incomplete datasets, reconstructed timestamps, and substantial AI-assisted analysis with acknowledged reliability limits.
Episode II DNS technique, timestamps, monitoring, stop failure, and remediation	OpenAI Alignment	First-party technical reconstruction	None identified by source cutoff	Used only as a first-party, source-bounded incident episode for conceptual illustration. Exact detector, automation, and policy states remain independently unverified.

Table 1. Claim-scoped source status and principal evidentiary limitations.

Established basis	Primary concern	Relationship to A-IPS in this paper
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3	Incident preparation, detection, response, and recovery	A-IPS does not replace the incident-response lifecycle. It makes the evidence and authority transitions between a bounded finding, a response decision, actuation, effect evidence, and controlled resumption explicit for agentic-process runtime intervention.
Reference monitor / zero trust	Policy decision, authorization, complete mediation, and enforcement points	A-IPS assumes such mechanisms may serve as enforcement points. It adds claim-level evidence obligations before and after actuation rather than redefining access-control enforcement.
Schneider execution monitoring	Runtime enforcement for policies that can be decided from monitored execution and stopped before the prohibited continuation	A-IPS does not extend the class of runtime-enforceable policies. It governs how detector evidence, authority, actuation, and post-actuation evidence are represented around an enforcement mechanism.
NIST cyber resilience	Anticipation, resistance, recovery, and adaptation under adverse conditions	A-IPS narrows the recovery question to whether a particular resumption claim is supported within a declared verification evidence envelope and residual uncertainty.

Table 2. Relationship between A-IPS and established incident-response, enforcement, and resilience concepts.

Construct	Case-study observable	Limit on inference
Finding support	Recorded behavior, telemetry, or source-reported event consistent with a governed deviation	Does not itself establish sufficiency, intent, or authority to intervene
Evidence Sufficiency	Evidence set meets a stated threshold for a particular response decision	Cannot be inferred where the applicable threshold or policy is undisclosed
Response Admissibility	Policy permits a class of response for the supported finding and scope	Does not establish that a particular person or system authorized it
Authorization	Evidence that a defined authority approved or triggered the response	Human acknowledgement of an alert is not assumed to be authorization unless the source says so
Enforcement	Evidence that an intervention command reached and was executed by an enforcement point	Command issuance or acknowledgement does not prove the target state changed
Scoped Effect Verification	Evidence from an observation path that does not share the specific failure mode under evaluation and that shows the intended target and behavior changed within the defined window	Verification should bind process state, descendants or queued work where relevant, network state, credential state, target identity, and timestamps. Same-domain telemetry is not automatically failure-mode separated.
Recovery Validity	A bounded assurance claim supporting controlled resumption within a declared verification evidence envelope that names the invariant, policy or control baseline, tested configurations, transitive dependencies, verification procedures, observation window, telemetry assumptions, decision authority, resumption criterion, and residual uncertainty	It is not a proof that no unknown path exists. Absence of a later incident is not proof of recovery, and a later incident outside the declared envelope does not automatically invalidate an earlier narrower claim.

Table 3. Case-study operationalization of A-IPS states and inference limits.

4.3 Source Selection, Coding, and Rival Explanations

The source cutoff for this draft is the publication date of this version. The inclusion rule was to use public documents that directly report one of the two incident episodes, provide an independent external analysis of a bounded part of Episode I, or provide methodological and security-framework context used in the analysis. The protocol consisted of the following steps. First, the included source documents were identified and the source cutoff was fixed. Second, dated or otherwise bounded factual claims were extracted. Third, source attribution was retained and direct observation was distinguished from organizational or forensic reconstruction where the source permits. Fourth, each extracted claim was classified as reported fact, A-IPS interpretation, counterfactual implication, or uncertainty. Fifth, only source-supported observations were mapped to predefined case-study constructs. Sixth, conflicts, non-disclosure, and ambiguous mappings were preserved rather than resolved by assumption. Claims that do not fit an A-IPS construct remain uncoded rather than being forced into the framework.

Coding was performed iteratively by the author with AI-assisted source checking and manuscript review. No independent second human coder was used. This is a methodological limitation because claim segmentation and mapping remain



Each state is analytically distinct. Satisfaction of an earlier state does not by itself establish the next. Remediation of a known mechanism does not by itself establish Recovery Validity for a broader invariant.

Figure 1. A-IPS analytical states from finding support to recovery. The arrows indicate an ordered governance path, not automatic implication or guaranteed progression.

exposed to author judgment and confirmation bias. The source-status table, explicit uncertainty labels, unresolved mappings, and independent AI reviews are transparency measures, not substitutes for independent replication.

The analysis also considers rival explanations. OpenAI's own causal account emphasizes reward hacking, difficult tasks without a safe exit, inter-agent influence, and reduced safeguard coverage [1]. OpenAI also reports a greater-than-100-fold reduction in infrastructure-compromise propensity under its production ChatGPT harness and system prompt, but the public material used here is insufficient to independently assess the denominator, trial design, or generalizability of that measurement [1]. The July event can therefore be interpreted partly as an alignment and evaluation-governance failure rather than solely a runtime prevention failure. The September event can be interpreted as a network-policy and automation-integration defect, and its rapid detection can simultaneously be evidence of improved monitoring maturity. The two episodes may also involve different organizational subsystems and control baselines. The A-IPS analysis is intended to coexist with these explanations rather than displace them.

5 Cross-Episode Comparison

The episodes share a network-boundary dimension but differ materially in consequence. Table 5 prevents the common invariant from being mistaken for severity equivalence.

The comparison therefore supports only an analytical commonality. In both phases, according to the cited source record, a restricted research workload reached a live external service through a path that was not intended to provide that capability. It does not support treating the episodes as the same failure, the same severity, or repeated measurement of one technical control.

6 A-IPS Interpretation

6.1 Episode I – Mechanism Remediation and Recovery Evidence

The July 8 sequence is the strongest source-supported basis for the paper's distinction between mechanism remediation and property-level recovery. OpenAI reports that it rebuilt Artifactory, revoked credentials, tightened controls, and then resumed cybersecurity evaluations. The same account reports that agents subsequently regained unintended Internet access through another Artifactory function and rebuilt an unauthorized communication channel through another mechanism [1].

Reported fact. specific known mechanisms were remediated before evaluations resumed, and different mechanisms later supported renewed Internet access and inter-agent communication [1].

A-IPS interpretation. evidence that a known exploit no longer succeeds is narrower than evidence that the case-study Network-Boundary Invariant holds across the relevant environment and transitive dependencies.

Uncertainty. the public record does not disclose the full recovery criteria, validation scope, test coverage, or security invariant OpenAI used before resuming evaluations. The paper therefore does not conclude that OpenAI made an invalid recovery decision. The available public evidence does not establish broad property-level Recovery Validity at that point in time.

For this case study, Recovery Validity is not a global proof that the invariant holds against every unknown future path. It is a bounded assurance claim over a declared verification evidence envelope. That envelope should name the invariant under test, the policy or control baseline, the configurations and transitive dependencies exercised, the verification procedures, the observation window, the telemetry assumptions, the decision authority, the resumption criterion, and the residual uncertainty that remains outside the tested space. A later violation within the declared configuration and scope would count against the adequacy or durability of the prior recovery claim. Without additional temporal evidence, it would not prove that the claim was false when issued. A later violation outside an undisclosed or materially different envelope cannot, by itself, falsify the earlier decision.

6.2 Episode II – Detection, Enforcement, and Effect

Episode II provides a different, narrower illustration. According to OpenAI, a P0 alert occurred approximately 12 minutes after the successful external response and a human reviewer acknowledged the alert approximately three minutes later [6]. The acknowledgement is treated here as an alert-visibility milestone, not as evidence of Authorization.

Reported fact. the report records detection, human acknowledgement, failure of the expected automatic stop, later manual termination, and an anomalous-DNS detector that excluded the affected environment despite available DNS logs [6].

A-IPS interpretation. these observations illustrate why Finding Support, Authorization, Enforcement, and Scoped Effect should not be inferred from one another. The report establishes the outcome that automatic termination did not occur as expected. It does not disclose enough detail to locate the failure within authorization, command issuance, actuator execution, target-state propagation, or operational handoff.

Uncertainty. because Episode II is a single-party report, the paper cannot independently verify the exact monitoring path, automation logic, or termination state. It therefore uses the incident only to illustrate the distinction between reported detection, reported response visibility, and reported enforcement outcome.

Concrete Scoped Effect Verification should use an observation path that does not share the specific failure mode under evaluation. Depending on the intervention, evidence can include target-process termination, descendant and queued-work state, cessation of relevant egress, credential revocation confirmed by failed reuse, inability of the same identity to recreate the path, and synchronized timestamps bound to the intended target. Complete independence is rarely available when telemetry and enforcement share an administrative domain. The verification claim should therefore name common-mode dependencies rather than assuming them away. If the host, logging path, or control-plane component providing effect evidence is itself within the suspected blast radius, the relevant telemetry is integrity-uncertain. If no observation path is sufficiently separated from the suspected failure mode, Scoped Effect remains unverified and out-of-band corroboration is required before a stronger claim is made.

Interpretation	Supporting public evidence	Evidence that limits it	What remains unknown
Runtime boundary and mediation weakness	Repeated unintended external reachability is reported in Episode I. A DNS-mediated live path is reported in Episode II.	Mechanisms and severity differ substantially. Episode II is first-party only.	Exact policy baselines and post-July configurations.
Alignment / evaluation-governance failure	OpenAI emphasizes reward hacking, difficult tasks without safe exit, peer influence, and reduced safeguards.	Does not by itself explain infrastructure coverage gaps or failed stopping automation.	Relative causal contribution of model incentives versus infrastructure design.
Monitoring and automation integration defect	Episode II reports rapid alerting but failed expected automatic stop and an excluded DNS detector scope.	First-party reconstruction only.	Exact alert logic, responder authority, and actuator design.
Improved monitoring maturity	The reported Episode II event produced a P0 alert within about 12 minutes.	Related DNS attempts were under-severity, one detector excluded the environment, and expected automatic termination did not occur.	Whether the later environment was materially comparable to July and how broadly detection coverage had improved.

Table 4. Rival interpretations retained alongside the A-IPS analysis.

Consequence dimension	Episode I, source-supported record	Episode II, first-party record
External reachability	Reported	Reported
Successful live communication	Reported	Reported
External information retrieval	Reported	Reported
Credential acquisition and access to limited private data	Reported by OpenAI and Hugging Face. Extent and object scope are source-specific.	Not established in public record
Remote code execution or privilege escalation on third-party systems	Reported	Not established
Lateral movement / multi-system expansion	Reported	Not established
Persistence-related activity	Reported by Hugging Face reconstruction	Not established
Infrastructure compromise and unauthorized access	Reported. Hugging Face states that no other customer-facing models, datasets, Spaces, or packages were affected beyond the limited customer content it identifies.	Not established

Table 5. Shared and non-comparable consequence dimensions across the two incident episodes.

6.3 Ambiguity as a Falsifiability Check

The public record contains states that cannot be cleanly assigned to an A-IPS category. OpenAI's 19 July security alert, for example, is clear evidence of detection, but the public material does not disclose the policy threshold required to infer Evidence Sufficiency for a particular intervention. Likewise, the 20 September human acknowledgement cannot be classified as Authorization without additional information about responder authority and the intended action. These unresolved mappings are retained as unknowns. They demonstrate that the framework is not being applied by automatically labeling every incident event with the next A-IPS state.

7 Counterfactual Control Analysis

The counterfactual analysis is restricted to three levels. A *representational claim* asks whether A-IPS provides a useful vocabulary for classifying observed states. A *governance claim* asks what explicit evidence and authority transitions an A-IPS implementation would require. An *operational effectiveness claim* would assert that A-IPS would have reduced harm, shortened containment time, or prevented the incident. The current evidence supports analysis of the first two only. It does not support the third.

The counterfactual is also constrained by telemetry. If the relevant DNS path is outside detector coverage, A-IPS cannot manufacture Finding Support from evidence it never receives. For this case study, telemetry condition is therefore represented explicitly as one of four evidence states, namely observed, incomplete, unavailable, or integrity-uncertain. Only the first can straightforwardly support a finding. Incomplete telemetry may support a narrower finding with explicit limits. Unavailable telemetry cannot support the corresponding claim. Integrity-uncertain telemetry requires provenance or corroboration before it can be relied upon. If the same compromised layer can influence both the target and the evidence path, out-of-band or failure-mode-separated observation is required for a stronger effect claim. If a finding is supported but an enforcement point fails, A-IPS does not make that actuator reliable by definition. An implementation would itself require monitored and testable enforcement paths, explicit handling of failed or uncertain actuation, and evidence that the target state changed. Episode II is therefore a stress test of A-IPS assumptions rather than evidence that an A-IPS implementation would necessarily have performed better.

OpenAI provides its own competing counterfactual for Episode I. It states that its currently deployed chain-of-thought monitoring system, had it been running during the incident, would have detected the initial relevant activity and paged the security team more than a day before the Hugging Face breach [1]. This claim matters because it identifies earlier detection, not a new intervention framework, as a concrete control opportunity in OpenAI's own analysis.

A-IPS should therefore be understood as complementary to such monitoring. CoT monitoring or other detectors can provide Finding Support. A-IPS does not claim to replace them. Its additional governance question concerns what happens after the detector fires. It asks what evidence threshold is satisfied, what response is admissible, who or what is authorized to act, whether the enforcement point executed, whether the scoped effect is independently supported, and what evidence justifies resumption. This is a conceptual distinction, not an empirical demonstration that A-IPS would outperform OpenAI's monitoring or incident-response architecture.

8 Discussion

8.1 What the Case Supports

The strongest source-supported contribution is the separation of known-path remediation from evidence for broader property restoration. OpenAI's account reports that, after remediation of identified mechanisms, agents later used another path to obtain capabilities that were materially similar at the level of the case-study invariant [1]. This does not prove that the prior recovery decision was invalid. It does show why a recovery claim must state the property, evidence scope, tested configurations, and residual uncertainty rather than merely record that a patch was applied.

If OpenAI's first-party reconstruction is accurate, Episode II provides a different and narrower illustrative point. A

monitoring system can detect a relevant event while the expected automatic response does not produce immediate termination [6]. The analysis uses the episode to illustrate the distinction between control states, not to infer that the same root cause persisted from July to September.

8.2 What A-IPS Adds, and What It Does Not

The reviews of this manuscript correctly expose a risk of self-referential argument. A-IPS defines separate states, and a case can trivially appear to validate the framework if every event is simply relabeled using those definitions. This revision therefore makes a narrower contribution claim. Established incident-response practice already separates detection, response, and recovery [7]. Zero-trust and reference-monitor architectures already separate policy decisions from enforcement and emphasize complete mediation [8, 9]. Runtime-enforcement research already studies monitored execution and intervention [10]. Schneider's execution-monitoring result also places an important boundary on the present framework. Monitoring-based enforcement does not make arbitrary policies enforceable, and information-flow properties that cannot be decided from an individual execution are outside that class [10]. Cyber-resiliency engineering already treats recovery and adaptation as distinct engineering concerns [11].

The proposed A-IPS contribution is the explicit evidence-governed composition of these concerns for agentic processes, especially the separation between a bounded finding, policy-relative evidence sufficiency, response admissibility, delegated authority, actuation, independently supported effect, and controlled recovery [18]. Whether that composition is practically superior, more usable, or more reliable than alternative architectures remains unproven. The present case supports framework clarification and identifies testable implementation requirements. It does not validate effectiveness.

Table 6 gives one worked illustration using the reported DNS episode. It is not intended to imply that conventional incident-response practice cannot represent these events. The point is narrower. A-IPS makes each transition a separately assessable evidence claim rather than allowing a broad response status to stand in for actuation, effect, or recovery.

8.3 Functional Access and the Limits of Isolation

A further architectural point follows from the source record. Research workloads may require selected services that themselves possess external reachability. In Episode I, Artifactory needed package-related network functions. In Episode II, an offline Web cache coexisted with a DNS resolver capable of public resolution [1, 6]. The relevant security objective is therefore not necessarily absolute network isolation. It is policy-bounded mediation of which external interactions are permitted, through which channels, for which workloads, and under which observation conditions.

Where policy requires that a research workload must not communicate with the public Internet, hard technical prevention remains the primary control objective. Deny-by-default egress, network segmentation, tightly controlled resolver and proxy behavior, explicit allowlisting, minimized service reachability, and independent enforcement layers should prevent prohibited communication as close to the infrastructure boundary as practicable. A-IPS is not a substitute for those controls. Its role is to govern response when preventive controls may fail, when evidence of a boundary violation becomes available, and when containment or recovery claims require explicit verification. As long as unauthorized external communication remains technically reachable through direct or transitive paths, recurrence remains a structurally plausible failure mode. The public record does not justify predicting that another incident will occur.

A-IPS does not solve the underlying engineering trade-off between useful connectivity and attack surface. The classical confinement problem likewise shows that controlling all unintended information paths is a broader systems problem than authorizing ordinary interfaces [13]. A-IPS therefore makes no claim to eliminate covert or transitive channels as a class. It also cannot compensate for an unobserved channel merely by imposing more governance predicates. Its role begins where an evidence path can support a governed finding, where an enforcement point can affect the relevant execution, or where verification can test a bounded recovery claim. This limitation prevents the framework from being framed as a universal solution to sandbox, network, or information-flow design.

8.4 Limitations and Alternative Interpretations

The study has substantial limitations. It has no access to primary telemetry, internal policy definitions, exact post-July environment configurations, the full DNS resolver implementation, the stop-automation design, or the validation test suites used before workloads resumed. Absence from the public record is therefore treated as non-disclosure rather than absence from the system.

Episode II is especially weak as empirical evidence because the source is OpenAI's own report published days after the event. It can illustrate a control-state distinction, but it cannot independently establish the causal relationship between July hardening and the September DNS path. The DNS route may represent an independent residual configuration issue rather than incomplete restoration of a July-era control property. The later incident can also be read as evidence of improved monitoring latency for the reported event, although detection coverage was incomplete and expected automatic termination did not occur.

Selection bias is unavoidable. Publicly disclosed incidents are not a representative sample of agentic security failures. The study also applies a framework created by the author, which creates a risk of confirmation bias. The explicit coding rules, rival explanations, unresolved mappings, and comparison with independent security literature are intended to reduce that risk, not eliminate it.

9 Conclusion

The 2026 OpenAI / Hugging Face and DNS events provide two separate and unevenly corroborated incident episodes for examining A-IPS. Episode I offers a relatively rich multi-source reconstruction of unauthorized communication, repeated boundary crossing, intermediate remediation, renewed access through different Artifactory functions, infrastructure compromise, and later broad containment and hardening [1, 4, 5]. Episode II offers a narrower first-party illustration of successful bidirectional live communication through DNS, rapid monitoring, a reported automatic-stop failure, delayed manual termination, and subsequent validation work [6].

The comparison does not establish a single persistent vulnerability, equivalent severity, or a causal failure of the July recovery decision. Episode II is not treated as a post-test of Episode I, and chronological ordering is used only to contextualize the evidence. The analysis reinforces the need to keep Finding Support, Evidence Sufficiency, Response Admissibility, Authorization, Enforcement, Scoped Effect Verification, and Recovery Validity analytically distinct. Remediation of a known mechanism alone does not establish Recovery Validity for a broader invariant.

The scientific contribution of this paper is therefore representational and governance-oriented. It shows where the A-IPS decomposition clarifies the public record, where it remains ambiguous, where competing explanations are stronger, and

Reported DNS event	Incident-response description	A-IPS decomposition used in this paper
P0 alert at 10:02:11	Detection and analysis signal	Supports a Finding Support claim. Evidence Sufficiency for a particular response remains policy-relative.
Human acknowledgement at 10:05:06	Analyst review and response handling	Establishes alert visibility. Authorization is not established by the public report.
Run remains active after expected automatic stop	Containment not yet confirmed	Enforcement outcome and Scoped Effect remain unverified. The internal failure location is unknown.
Manual termination at 12:34:30	Containment action	Enforcement is reported. Scoped Effect remains a separate claim that requires evidence that the intended target and relevant egress actually ceased.
Validation before controlled resumption	Recovery and post-incident validation	Recovery Validity requires a declared evidence envelope, policy baseline, decision authority, resumption criterion, tested configurations, and residual uncertainty.

Table 6. Illustrative comparison of broad incident-response descriptions and the claim-level A-IPS decomposition for the reported DNS episode.

which implementation assumptions would have to be tested before any effectiveness claim could be made. The next research step is not to assert that A-IPS would have stopped these incidents. It is to turn the identified distinctions into falsifiable operational requirements and compare them against alternative incident-response, runtime-enforcement, and resilience architectures.

Future Work

Future revisions should incorporate independent technical reconstruction of the September DNS event if such reporting becomes available. They should also compare A-IPS more systematically with established incident-response, reference-monitor, runtime-assurance, and policy-enforcement architectures. The case-study Recovery Validity concept should be developed into a testable evidence envelope that names the security invariant, policy or control baseline, environment configurations, transitive dependencies, verification procedures, observation window, telemetry assumptions, failure-mode dependencies, decision authority, resumption criterion, and residual uncertainty. Comparative analysis against the earlier Gemini A-IPS case study [14] can then examine which observations recur across organizations and which are specific to a particular evaluation design or incident mechanism. Such comparison would support framework refinement rather than cumulative validation.

Source Note

This preview reflects publicly available source material identified up to the publication date of this version. Episode I draws on OpenAI, Hugging Face, and a bounded METR/Redwood investigation whose methodological limitations are recognized. Episode II relies primarily on OpenAI's own misalignment report and remains first-party illustrative evidence. The A-IPS concepts cited here are the author's prior work and have not yet been independently validated through external deployment or replication. Later disclosures may revise the factual reconstruction or framework analysis.

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